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Abstract
We present a model of interpersonal comparisons appearing as a generalization of a multi-state
model for elements with internal bias. Within this model agents suffering under dissatisfaction
compare them with their neighbors. The internal bias are the pre-formed preferences, and the states
are represented by the visual contacts that an agent makes to the baskets of her/his neighbors. The
topology of the comparisons is a random network. We compare the behavior between altruistic and
non-altruistic agents and we find out that altruistic behavior alters the robustness of the network.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Complex networks connected by web like structures have been intensively studied, as-
suming that their elements are homogeneous. Such networks could be generated by means
of technical elements and be used for communication [1] (airports, wireless links, internet,
etc.) or could be defined as communication between individuals (social networks) [2].
We model agents that, after a distribution of goods, subtend a network of interpersonal
comparison. The fair distribution of goods is an old problem in mathematics that con-
cerns not only distribution of perfectly divisible goods (for example a cake), but also the
distribution of for example CO2 emissions [3, 4]. Along this work we do not search for an
optimal distribution, but analyse the ’feelings’ arising after this distribution is done. After
a distribution takes place, agents are allowed to make interpersonal comparisons, depending
on how this distribution was done and how were the individual satisfaction levels among
the agents [5]. The mechanism is as follows: each agent is endowed with a pre-established
list of preferences that produce a bias in the distribution. Each agent tries to optimize the
number of elements he/she gets according to this preference list. This bias appears not
only as a pre-distribution but also a post distribution mechanism: the agents are allowed to
subtend a network of interpersonal comparisons according to the preferences that were not
fulfilled. Such a network is basically an information-exchange network. This model can be
generalized for information networks that emerge in systems which are not symmetric and
far from equilibria, because of the individual bias.
The existence of individual bias (preferences) could also change the topology of the net-
work. This characteristic is relevant for weighed unidirectional networks [6]. However, the
general alternative proposed in this work may motivate a new class of models for random
networks. The nodes of our network are not only defined by the agents, but also by the
material and cognitive possessions each agent has. Each state is not aprioristically defined,
but is computed after the distribution process, depending on the individual bias. At differ-
ence with conventional models (for a general review see [1]), our approach can concern the
definition of elements (nodes of the comparison network), not only with different but also
with changing identities.
An important task concerning random networks is to describe how its formation and
connectivity are. For instance, the analysis of the distribution of connections per node has
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been analyzed for Internet [7]. In a previous work the connectivity was only analyzed as
a function of the kind of distribution [5]. But agents, making interpersonal comparisons,
are also exchanging information in form of visual contacts. This information can randomly
be controlled, for example, avoiding that an agent look into the basket of other agent in
the neighbor. We call this mechanism censure. This control is equivalent to a random
breakdown, where elements in the network are randomly removed [1, 8]. If p is a fraction of
nodes under censure, then, after some threshold value pc, the network disintegrates it into
smaller disconnected parts. Below the critical threshold value the network, connecting each
of the nodes, persists. The random breakdown of a network trespassing the threshold of an
infinite dimensional percolation problem.
Non homogeneous and constant nodes have been already studied [9]. As a difference
our nodes also are able to change their identities, making the inhomogeneities dependent
on the time. The agents can behave in two different ways. Either they simply subtend a
network of interpersonal comparisons after the distribution process, or they can be altruistic.
Altruistic agents are giving some of their owned goods to agents with a lower satisfaction
level, attempting to improve the welfare of the system. Each node consists of a cognitive
part (the agent able to make decisions and with a mental bias) and a material part (the
basket with goods). Thus, a donation of a good implies an identity change. By using this
example we try to answer the question, if this change of identity may induce a change in
the percolation transition (breakdown of the connectivity of the nodes) of the network.
II. MODEL AND FORMALISM
Hamiltonian: The internal restrictions imposed to individual agents are the basis of a
non-equilibrium state. For instance, in the case of a distribution of goods, individual bias
does not allow an equitable distribution. However, the system tries to compensate this non-
equilibrium state by means of interpersonal comparisons that could later imply interpersonal
exchange of goods. This situation has been previously implemented for individual agents
randomly matched according to similarity of preferences promoting exchange [10]. These
comparisons are essentially an exchange of information, because each agent gets ’visual’
information of the goods other agents own. Each agent has a bias to the kind of goods but
not to that neighboring agent. Therefore, this information exchange takes place in a random
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way, conforming a random network between agents. In the following part the definition of
the Hamiltonian for the exchange and its states is done.
For each interpersonal comparison we define a Hamiltonian in a similar way as for a
multi-state system, where the energy relation of the system is given by its connectivity [11].
The function Ei(j) depends on the order of the restriction imposed to the system. Here
the restriction is the preference ranking in a system of envious agents. If it is not possible
to establish any comparison between two agents with the first element of the list, then the
second element in the list is used as restriction to the comparison. We define here this
restriction by Cki in the following form
Cki =


1, if agent i is still in doubt to be satisfied or not before k comparisons take place
0 otherwise
.
(1)
An interpersonal comparison is allowed only if an agent express some dissatisfacion. This
expression is more precisely defined in the following way
Cki =
k−1∏
l=1
δ(bi(Pi(l)), bj(Pi(l))); (2)
in eq. (2) bi are the baskets, where the agents store their goods after the distribution. Pi(l)
is the preference list, that depends on the class of goods l. Using this notion, the function
Ei(j) has the following form
Ei(j) =
K∑
k=1
Θ(bj(k)− bi(k))C
k
i , (3)
where Θ(x) is the step function, bi(k) represents the number of elements of type k in the
basket of agent i, where k is the number of elements into the basket bi of each agent i and
K the total good types. From equation (3) we are able to derive the following cases
Ei(j) =


1 if agent i is not satisfied (feels envy)
0 otherwise
. (4)
The equation (3) is the definition of the individual states of the system. The Hamiltonian
is in general defined via the connectivity between the states of the different agents, and is
given as the sum over i and j of Eq. (3)
E =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
η(i, j)×Ei(j). (5)
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This model belongs to a general class of models, which under some constrains appear like a
conventional multi-state system [12].
Dynamics: One agent i is linked to the agent j if the state Ej > 0. The transition
probability is given by
W(t; t+ 1) = Θ(Ei(t)−Ec), (6)
with Ei =
∑N
j=1 η(i, j)× Ei(j). In this expresion, Θ(Ei(t)− Ec) is again the step function.
In our implemented model, the treshold value is given by Ec = 0. The updating for the
number of envious agents is given by a Langevin equation of motion [13], given by
Ni(t + 1) = Ni(t)−Ni(t)WNi(t; t+ 1) +
N∑
i=1
NiWNi(t; t + 1). (7)
In a previous study, the identity of the elements has been defined in a static form [5].
However, this identity can change and be tracked. This assumption is more realistic to
model multi-agent systems, than the consideration of fixed properties. We assume a pre-
distribution inside the states bi previous to the conformation of the connections between
states. In our example of dissatisfied agents, this assumption is equivalent to altruistic
agents that donate the elements of their baskets to other agents.
Indeed, an additional equation of motion for the redistribution of the elements among
the states bi must be considered. A donation from agent j to agent i is given by
bi(t+ 1) = bi(t) +
Nd∑
j=1
δ(bi − bj)δ(ω − ω0), (8)
whereas for the agent j the following process (substraction inside the state bj) takes place
bj(t + 1) = bj(t)−
Nd∑
i=1
δ(bi − bj)δ(ω − ω0); (9)
in equations (8) and (9) Nd represents the number of donators into the system and ω0 is
the allowed donation frequency. Both equations of motion (8) and (9) are coupled to the
equation of motion for the number of connected states in Eq. (7).
The whole system is subjected to an initial non-symmetrical distribution G(K) of K
elements among the agents. As was defined in a similar model [5], where the distribution
function were defined as a gamma function, the symmetry of the distribution of goods
among the individuals depends on a parameter A, i.e if A→ 0, then the distribution is not
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fair. This asymmetry sets the system out from equilibrium and motivates the interpersonal
comparison. In this context a question remains: is the information exchange, the initial
distribution, defined by A, or both parameters relevant for the behavior of the system?
Which of both parameters can modulate the interpersonal comparisons into the system?
III. RESULTS
The exchange of information between agents (or agent connectivity) depends on the
parameter κ which is related to ηi,j as κ =
∑
i<j ηi,j, which can be understood by means
of the following aphorism: the social temperature of a system depends on the censure in
the system. With less censure the agents are allowed to compare themselves, increasing the
fluctuations of the system. In the present results, κ represents the censure (temperature)
parameter, which is also equivalent to the breakdown parameter of the network.
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FIG. 1: Time series of the number of agents with and without interpersonal comparisons for four
parameters κ (κ = 0.1 upper left, κ = 0.5 upper right, κ = 0.8 under left, κ = 1 under right) and
fixed initial distribution A = 80. By increasing κ the number of linked agents approaches to the
number of non-linked agents.
The control on the connectivity is equivalent to the random breakdown of networks, i.e.
the number of agents that are not able to exchange information is equivalent to remove the
agent from the network. The principal observables here are the fraction of nodes that resist
to interpersonal comparisons as a function of κ. Using this notion, the number of linked
states C as a function of the frequency of information exchange fl was estimated. For fl = 0
the system starts from a fully non-interconnected state. Whereas the system evolves, the
6
connectivity between agents increases. For fl →∞ the system reaches an equilibrium. The
time series for some states as a function of κ is shown in Fig. 1.
For very small values of κ, there is a clear separation of linked and non-linked agents.
Conform the connectivity increases, the phase separation decreases. Eventually at some κc
there is a mixture of linked and non-linked agents. For values above this point the system
saturates, i.e. reaches a maximum in the number of links between agents. The number of
linked states C is shown in Fig. 2. Here it is important to observe that there is no complete
mixture between linked and non-linked agents for κ > κc. Given that in each iteration there
are agents that are completely satisfied, they are of course indifferent to the modification of
the parameter κ, yielding a shift in the distribution of linked agents.
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FIG. 2: Non normalized density of states ρ(C) is presented for different parameters κ (κ = 0.1
upper left, κ = 0.5 upper right, κ = 0.8 under left, κ = 1 under right) and fixed initial distribution
A = 80. Due that there are agents that reach a high satisfaction level in few iteration steps, there
is no total mixture of satisfied and unsatisfied agents at κ ∼ κc.
The role of κ is decisive for the transition from fully interconnected agents to isolated
ones. The phase behavior of the density of states as a function of κ has been investigated
and plotted in Fig. 3. Indeed, two main cases are compared: when an initial distribution
G(K) and interpersonal comparisons arises, and when an additional altruistic distribution
of goods between agents takes place. This comparison is made for a fixed distribution A. In
this plot the fraction of the number of the non connected nodes in relation to the connected
nodes CN = (C−CE)/CE as a function of κ (normalized) is shown, where N is the maximal
number of connected nodes.
In both cases, the relative density of states decays in a lineal form, i.e. C ∼ κ. The slope
of the curves depends on whether there is altruistic exchange or not. This lineal dependence
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is valid for κ << κc. However, conform κ approaches to its critical value, a non-linear
behavior for values of CN/CE is found. For non altruistic agents there is a small step for
0.92 < κ < 0.96. For κ > 0.96 the system reaches a saturation, and the relative density
reaches a plateau. This behavior could be related with finite size effects.
The presence of altruistic agents makes the behavior of the system more interesting. The
phase diagram has at least two plateaus for κ < κc, one at κ = 0.92 and κ = 0.96. The
last plateau is reached when the system is saturated, i.e. for κ ≤ 1. One can assume that
this effect is due to statistical errors in the estimation of the results. However, the error
estimated is above the curve for non-exchange (see the inset of Fig. 2). Despite the network
presents these breakdowns, the network still preservesits robustness while κ increases. The
transition in this case takes place for κ larger than the transition without exchange.
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FIG. 3: Phase diagram of the fraction of agents resistant interpersonal comparisons as a function of
the random breakdown of the network, given by the parameter κ. The behavior for both altruistic
and non-altruistic agents is compared; both cases were fitted with a linear regression, with two
slopes B1 and B2. The behavior of altruistic agents for A = 40 is also shown. In the inset the
behavior of the curve close to the critical parameter κc is shown.
If altruism takes place, the interconnectivity cannot increase and an internal resistance
grows until a new saturation is reached. Indeed, this behavior can be described as a kind of
fractional formation of interconnected agents, where exchange between agents on k changes
the internal energy of the system.
One can suppose that the initial distribution G(k) may change the phase behavior of
the interconnectivity between agents. The simulations performed for A = 40 show that the
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behavior is similar to A = 80 for κ < κc. This result confirms and generalizes the results
obtained in a previous work [5]. For κ ∼ κc the fraction of agents resistant to interpersonal
comparisons is higher. This result is surprising but not strange, because the more asymmetric
the initial distribution the faster some agents can fill their baskets, increasing the number
of agents that are insensitive to the parameter κ. In both cases κc is a fixed point. Hence,
the symmetry of the initial distribution modifies the phase behavior of the system near the
critical point, but not the whole behavior, which essentially depends on the information
exchange between agents and on the change of the states bi(k) by internal redistribution of
k, i.e. on information exchange and altruism.
IV. DISCUSSION
In general, the change of identity of the elements of a random network may influence
its robustness. We were not able to introduce a dramatic change in the robustness of the
network; however, it is possible that extreme fluctuations in the identity of the elements
may introduce changes, increasing the resistance to make new connections in the network.
In extreme cases such fluctuations can break down the connectivity of the network. Another
important aspect is the definition of the network. In specific problems, the identity of the
elements may depend on initial definitions that cannot be made ad-hoc, as has been shown
in the present example of interpersonal comparisons.
Intuitively one can assume that altruism, or redistribution on the number of objects k
among the agents, can avoid the formation of interconnected states. However, the present
results show that above a critical censure parameter κc the system is fully interconnected.
The effect of altruism, as defined for the present work, is remarkable for states close to κc: it
does not avoid the transition from connected to disconnected states, but offers a resistance
in the formation of such connections
The modulation of the information exchange, i.e., the intensity of the censure, and not
the distribution, is essential in the control of interpersonal comparisons. However, the
symmetry of the elements and their equilibrium, which depends, in the present example,
on the distribution of goods among the agents, have influence in the robustness of the
network. If the system is close to equilibrium, i.e. there is an equitable distribution (when
the parameter A is large), the agents have more chance to make donation of goods because
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there are more available goods to give, modifying the frequency of interpersonal comparisons.
Otherwise, the asymmetry of the initial distribution cannot be prevented by donations and
a network of comparisons emerges.
In the whole model the individual biases play a relevant role. They are relevant for the
definition of part of the nodes, of the interpersonal comparisons and the promoting of an
altruistic behavior. Hence the formation of these biases is relevant in the formulation of such
kind of models. The simple variant adopted in this work is to define them in a random way.
However, information exchange should be also considered in more realistic models, not only
as simple interpersonal comparison, but also in formation and modification of such biases.
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